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 Thank you for your patronage:
How social connections impact
bureaucratic efﬁciency
When promotions are more about whom you
know than what you know, chances are that
the top jobs, even in the public sector, don’t
go to the most ablest or hardest working
employees, but to the best connected. This
can affect the ability of bureaucracies to
regulate, implement reforms and provide
public resources conducive to development
and growth. Today’s blog looks at the impact
of social connections on bureaucratic
efﬁciency
While social connections can weave a web of corruption within
the public sector, they can also form a fabric of trust: what may
seem like an “old boy network” may reflect better information
about the quality of socially connected civil servants.
Appointing a connected civil servant to key positions within
bureaucracies may help politicians secure the loyalty and
support needed to implement critical policies. Although
anecdotal examples for cronyism abound, how social
connections shape the allocation and performance of senior
bureaucrats is ultimately still poorly understood.
The empirical challenge
This is perhaps no surprise: social networks, especially when
potentially involving cronyism, are difficult to observe; with a
few exceptions, the internal workings of bureaucracies still
remain a blackbox to outsiders. The challenge for bureaucrats
and public organisation is the difficulty of measuring
performance and bureaucratic efficiency. Measurement of
quantifiable outputs, such as teacher quality can be measured
indirectly via student test scores; in contrast, measuring the
output of bureaucracies is much less tangible, and thus,
challenging.
Patronage through the lens of history
In my research, I take a bird’s eye view providing unique
historical evidence from the administration of the British
colonies between 1854-1966 through a single British Ministry:
the Colonial Office. The administration of the colonies through
centrally appointed bureaucrats – the governors – provides a
suitable setting to study the impact of social connections.
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suitable setting to study the impact of social connections.
 Governors were senior bureaucrats appointed at the discretion
of the Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Colonial
Secretary), the political head of the Colonial Office. As the
“man on the spot”, governors wielded substantial executive and
legislative power over their territories, and revenue performance
was the central measure of performance.
I use historical administrative reports recovered from extensive
archival work to construct a novel dataset that traces the
careers and performance of the Colonial Office from its birth in
1854 to its dissolution in 1966, tracking appointments of
colonial governors across 70 colonies. To identify social
connections, I leverage genealogical and biographical data to
identify the causal effect of social connections on the allocation
and performance of governors, I exploit the turnover of
Colonial Secretaries as a natural experiment. The reshuffling of
Colonial Secretaries exposes serving governors to different
degrees of connections: one governor, for example, may be
connected to his boss at one time, but then lose the connection
as his boss leaves office. I compare the promotion and career
outcomes of the same governor at times connected and
unconnected to estimate the effect of social connections.
Preliminary results uncover substantial amounts of
favouritism
Governors connected to the Colonial Secretary are paid higher
wages. This increase is driven by the reallocation of connected
governors to higher salaried governorships. While the
promotion of connected governors to higher salaried jobs per se
need not be detrimental to organisational performance, social
connections have a large negative impact on contemporaneous
colony-level revenue performance. Governors connected to the
Colonial Secretary generate less revenue and invest less in the
colonies.
The preliminary results were presented at the IGC Growth
Week’s Emerging Research session. The ﬁnal results will
be available by October 2016.
